:  Korgin N
:  Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise
:  
:  2014
:   ..
:  Automation and Remote Control
() :  Volume 75, Issue 5
:  Korgin N. A. Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise //Automation and Remote Control. 2014. Vol. 75. . 5. pp. 983-995.
:  We demonstrate that any sequential allotment rule enjoying strategy-proofness on the domain of single-peaked preference functions can be represented in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of active expertise on the domain of multidimensional single-plateaued preference functions, i.e., a generalized median voter scheme with a tie-breaking rule.

: (1134%2FS0005117914050178)
: (php)

: 2730, : 2030, : 12.


© 2007.