Автор: Korgin NA,
Korepanov VO
Название: An efficient solution of the resource allotment problem with the Groves–Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility
Статус: опубликовано
Год: 2016
Тип публикации: статья вед.журн.
Название журнала или конференции: Automation and Remote Control
Полная библиографическая ссылка: Korgin N. A., Korepanov V. O. An efficient solution of the resource allotment problem with the Groves–Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility //Automation and Remote Control. – 2016. – Vol. 77. – №. 5. – pp. 914-942.
Аннотация: This paper designs an allotment mechanism for a limited amount of an infinitely divisible good (resource) among a finite number of agents under transferable utility. The mechanism is efficient in the sense of total agents’ utility maximization. As a solution, we introduce an adaptation of the Groves–Ledyard “quadratic government” that was initially suggested for the problem of public good.
Метод моделирования: Имитационное моделирование / Деловые игры
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