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: Barbera S., Masso J., Neme A.
: Voting under Constraints : ( ): Elsevier : 1997 : : Journal of Economic Theory () : 2 : 76 : Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Voting under Constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 298-321, 10. : We consider a broad class of situations where a society must choose from a finite set of alternatives. This class includes, as polar cases, those where the preferences of agents are completely unrestricted and those where their preferences are single-peaked. We prove that strategy-proof mechanisms in all these domains must be based on a generalization of the median voter principle. Moreover, they must satisfy a property, to be called the \intersection property,\ which becomes increas- ingly stringent as the preference domain is enlarged. In most applications, our results precipitate impossibility theorems. In particular, they imply the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem as a corollary. : ( ) : : : (pdf) : 12137, : 609, : 1. |